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NOTES
THE DRIVER'S LICENSE "DISPLAY" STATUTE:
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM ITS APPLICATION
Virtually every state has provided by statute' that a motorist must
carry his operator's license with him at all times while operating a
motor vehicle, and display it upon the demand of a police officer. 2
Typically, failure to comply with the demand constitutes prima facie
evidence of driving without a license, which is universally a misde-
meanor.
1. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 36, § 65 (1940); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 50-1-4(e)
(8) (Supp. 1957); Ariz. Code Ann. § 28-423 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-323
(1957); Cal. Vehicle Code Ann. § 12951 (Deering 1959); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-3-13 (Supp. 1957); Conn. .Gen. Stat. § 14-217 (1958); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21,
§ 2719(b) (1953); D.C. Code Ann. § 40-301(c) (Supp. 1960); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 322.15 (1958); Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-9906 (1958); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 16045
(1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 49-319 (1957); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 951h, § 6-118 (Smith-
Hurd 1958); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-2714(b) (Supp. 1960); Iowa Code Ann. § 321.-
190 (1949); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-244 (Supp. 1959); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 186.510 (1955); La. Rev. Stat. § 32:411(D) (Supp. 1959); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
c. 22, § 153 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 66%, § 97 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 90,
§ 25 (1954); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 9.2011 (1952); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 171.08 (1946);
Miss. Code Ann. § 8108 (1957); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 302.181(2) (1952); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 31-136 (1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-413 (1952); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 483.350 (1959); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262:26 (Supp. 1959); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 39:3-29 (1940); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-13-49 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. Vehicle &
Traffic Law § 20.1 (e); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-29 (1953); N.D. Rev. Code § 39-0616
(Supp. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4507.35 (Baldwin 1958); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 47, § 285 (1950) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 482.300(2) (1959) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75,
§ 783(a) (1953); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 10, § 31-10-25 (1957); S.C. Laws 1959
§ 46-162, at 427; S.D. Laws 1959 c. 261, § 11, at 361; Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-709
(Supp. 1959); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6687b, § 13 (1960); Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-2-15(b) (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 23, § 611 (1959); Va. Code Ann. §
46.1-7(c) (1958); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.20.190 (1951); W.Va. Code Ann. §
1721(217) (1955); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 343.18(1) (1958); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-271 (1959).
2. There is a variance among the states as to who is authorized to make the
demand, but generally any "peace officer" has the power.
3. The Missouri statute contains the typical provisions:
The license shall be carried at all times by the holder thereof while driving
a motor vehicle, and shall be displayed upon demand of any officer of the
highway patrol, or any police officer or peace officer, or any other duly
authorized person, for inspection when demand is made therefor. Failure
of any chauffeur or operator of a motor vehicle to exhibit his license to
any of the aforesaid officers, or other duly authorized officer, shall be pre-
sumptive evidence that said person is not a duly authorized chauffeur or
motor vehicle operator. Mo. Ann. Stat. §302.181(2) (1952).
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These statutes (which may be called "display" statutes) are silent on
the questions of when or under what circumstances the police are
legally authorized to make the demand. However, under color of such
statutes, police have assumed the right to stop automobiles at any time
and request the drivers thereof to exhibit their licenses. This asserted
power has been exercised even in situations where the authorities have
neither seen nor had probable cause to believe that the drivers were
violating traffic laws or committing crimes in their presence.4 Cur-
rently, these "display" provisions have become the basis for systematic
license checks through the erection of roadblocks on well-travelled
thoroughfares.
Until recently, this assumption of power by police had never been
challenged directly. As a result, the law in the area was confined to
decisions wherein the validity of the practice arose as merely a col-
lateral issue. However, a late Florida decisions in which this action
of the police was the primary issue, has emphasized the problems
inherent in these statutes.
The two basic situations where the question may arise are outlined
as follows: (1) The police may establish a roadblock for the purpose
of enforcing the licensing laws and pursuant thereto, they may ex-
amine the permits of those motorists who are stopped. (2) The police
may intercept and "pull-over" an individual motorist and ask to see his
permit. If the driver fails to comply with the request, or the police
notice some suspicious article in the car, the occupants might then be
taken into custody and prosecuted, in the latter case for a crime other
than driving without a license, on the basis of evidence disclosed by a
search conducted after the arrest. On the other hand, the police may
pull-over a car on the pretext of enforcing the licensing laws, but this
is a subterfuge and their real motive is to investigate an unfounded
suspicion regarding another crime. A "fishing expedition" in the form
of an unwarranted search is then conducted which uncovers evidence
of a crime for which the occupants of the car are subsequently prose-
cuted.
In any of these situations, if the driver displays his permit and no
search is undertaken, or a search discloses nothing and he is allowed
to continue, he might sue to enjoin the practice. On the other hand,
if the driver refuses to display his permit, or a search is conducted
which uncovers incriminating evidence, he may move to suppress this
evidence at the trial. In all cases, the gravamen of the driver's claim
4. See, e.g., Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959),
where the halting was based solely on the ragged physical appearance of the
occupants.
5. City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959).
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is that the original stopping constituted an illegal procedure, i.e., an
arrest without probable cause, and was, therefore, in violation of his
constitutional rights.6
THE ROADBLOCK SITUATION
City of Miami v. Aronovitz7 was the first decision to present squarely
the issues of whether the roadblock stopping of vehicles to check
drivers' licenses without probable cause to believe that a particular
driver was unlicensed was (1) authorized by the "display" statute, and
(2) constitutionally permissible as a valid exercise of the police power.
Aronovitz, a former mayor of Miami, was lawfully operating his
automobile along a street in that city when he observed cars ahead of
him being halted at a police licease-check roadblock. An officer pre-
vented his turning onto another street, motioning him into the line of
cars approaching the checkpoint. After displaying his license, he was
permitted to drive on. Subsequently, he filed suit in the state court
against various city officials including the Chief of Police, seeking,
among other things, to enjoin them from using roadblocks or similar
devices to stop automobiles without probable cause to believe the driver
was acting unlawfully8 Aronovitz contended that the stopping vio-
lated due process in contravention of the state and federal constitu-
tions in that it (1) constituted an unreasonable interference with his
right as a citizen to use the public highways, and (2) was an unlawful
arrest.9 Further, he argued that the roadblock was a mere sham to
give the police an opportunity to search his car.0
The Chancellor found for Aronovitz and issued a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the authorities from stopping motorists by means of
roadblocks or other devices unless these officials "should observe or
have probable cause to believe that... [the driver] .. . has committed
or aided in the commission of a crime.""' On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed, 2 holding: (1) the right to use the highways
is subject to reasonable regulation for the public welfare; (2) a
6. It must be assumed that in none of these situations is the detained auto-
mobile violating traffic laws, otherwise probable cause is clearly present.
7. 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959).
8. It is not clear from ihe opinion whether the validity of the "display" statute
on its face was in issue or whether the question concerned merely its application.
It is submitted that the latter was the case.
9. The basis of these contentions was the case of Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v.
Ward, 102 Fla. 1105, 137 So. 163 (1931).
10. This contention involves the "subterfuge" doctrine and will be considered
in connection with the discussion of the "pull-over" situation to follow.
11. 114 So. 2d at 786.
12. There was no intermediate appeal because by statute the supreme court
had jurisdiction to review directly interlocutory decrees of this type.
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driver's license is a privilege, not a right, and the operator accepts the
privilege subject to reasonable restrictions; (3) the regulation, i.e.,
the roadblock stopping, was reasonable and necessary to prevent those
drivers whose licenses had been suspended, revoked, or who had never
had them from continuing to use the highways; (4) a requirement of
probable cause would "produce almost total disablement of law
enforcement officers in the performance of a needed police power
which has been granted to them by the Legislature ... .,,13 and (5)
there was no showing of subterfuge sufficient to question the good
faith of the officers.
Where a roadblock is used to stop a motorist, it would be almost im-
possible for the police to have probable -cause to stop any particular
driver.1 The City of Miami prevailed in the Aronovitz case because
the court refused to read into the "display" statute a requirement that
the officer have probable cause to believe that this motorist was un-
licensed as a condition precedent to the authority to stop the car. In
lieu of this, the court substituted a requirement of what might be
termed "general probable cause." The Miami authorities had intro-
duced detailed statistical reports illustrating the number of drivers'
licenses which had been revoked or suspended in the Miami area in
previous months, and also the successes of other roadblocks in appre-
hending violators. The obvious purpose of this evidence was to con-
vince the court that, although probable cause concerning each driver
stopped at a roadblock was not possible, proof of necessity or "general
probable cause" within a particular geographical area could always
be obtained, and that acceptance of the latter form of justification
would permit sufficient judicial control of the activity while simulta-
neously promoting effective policing of the highways. The decision
of the court in favor of the city reflects the complete success of the
argument, and it is submitted that this reasoning would and should be
adopted in all roadblock controversies."
In approving the use of a systematic roadblock to enforce the licens-
ing laws, the court in the Aronovitz case stated:
The possibility that a power of government may be abused if
improperly asserted under conditions which do not justify it is
13. 114 So. 2d at 789.
14. One possible exception would be the case where the automobile stopped
matches the description of one known to have been used in the commission of
a crime.
15. This argument would be equally applicable to the situation where there
was no "display" statute. Licensing was originally undertaken primarily as a
source of revenue, but due to congested road conditions, all states have passed
"license" and "display" statutes to help rid the highways of unfit drivers, so the
point is moot.
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not necessarily a valid argument for denying the existence of the
power or its reasonable exercise in a proper case in the interest of
the public good.'6
By implication this statement recognizes that there may be cases in
which the power to stop a car and demand that the driver display his
operator's license might be unreasonably exercised under conditions
which do not justify it. To determine what those cases and conditions
might be, the pull-over situation with its many variations will now be
examined.
THE "PULL-OVER" SITUATION
The identical arguments employed in the roadblock situation might
have logical application where police, pursuant to a departmental
directive or on their own initiative, pull-over an individual motorist
and demand display of his driver's license. However, when a roadblock
is used to enforce the licensing laws, the police have no way of pre-
determining what cars will pass the particular location chosen to
establish the roadblock. This fact negates the possibility that the
police might stop a particular car for purposes other than the reason-
able and therefore legitimate license check. In the pull-over situation
there is no such assurance since the police may decide to stop any car
at any time and place. While they might ask to see the driver's license
for the purpose for which the "display" statute was passed, their
primary motive in stopping the car might well be: (1) to check the
identity of the occupants of the car; (2) to examine the car for un-
concealed contraband which would give them sufficient probable cause
to make an arrest without a warrant; or (3) to conduct an unwar-
ranted search of the car where the driver is arrested for driving with-
out a license or for another crime.
In the pull-over situation then, the courts have developed two meth-
ods to insure that police use the "display" provisions to accomplish
the intended end of licensing law enforcement rather than for some
other unlawful purpose such as search without a warrant. One method,
the requireient of probable cause, requires that police have probable
cause to believe that a driver is unlicensed before they may lawfully
stop him, even though the statute itself contains no such express pro-
vision.' This method would say that the motive of the police is not
determinative of their authority to stop a car since the requirement of
specific probable cause provides a method of control in pull-over cases
comparable to the general probable cause required in the roadblock
16. 114 So. 2d. at 789.
17. See Edwards v. State, 319 P.2d 1021 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), where the
court reasoned that probable cause or reasonable belief of some vehicle code viola-
tion should precede any stopping to check drivers' licenses, "except perhaps where
a roadblock has been established for wholesale checking." Id. at 1026.
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situation, except that it would be a rare case indeed where the police
would have probable cause to believe that a specific driver was un-
licensed before the car was stopped and the display requested and
refused. The other method, known as the "subterfuge" doctrine, as-
signs controlling importance to the motive of the police. If their
primary motive was to examine the license, the stopping was lawful
regardless of whether they had specific probable cause.
A. REQUIREMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Two approaches, the "Arrest" and the "Interpretation," might be
employed to construe the "display" statute to require specific probable
cause in the pull-over situation.
1. "Arrest" Approach
This approach would first assume that the original stopping is an
arrest in itself, and then subdivide into two parallel arguments. The
first is that since the stopping is an arrest, it would violate due process
if allowed without probable cause. Therefore, rather than hold the
"display" statute invalid on its face, the court should read such a
requirement into it. The second argument reasons that since at com-
mon law an arrest could not be lawful except upon probable cause, any
statute not specifically demanding that requirement is in derogation
of the common law and is to be strictly construed against the state.
Applying a strict construction, it may be argued that the "display"
provisions refer merely to the duty of the motorist and are not in-
tended to vest absolute power in police officers.1s
The basic assumption of this approach may be fatal to its effective-
ness. Professor Perkins cites four requirements which have been
suggested for an arrest at common law: 19 (1) a purpose to take the
person into custody, (2) under a real or pretended authority, (3) re-
sulting in an actual or constructive seizure or detention of his person,
(4) so understood by the arrestee.2 0 It is obvious that the mere stop-
ping of an automobile by a policeman would not meet the first require-
ment, and probably the fourth would be lacking as well. Therefore,
Perkins would say there was no arrest, for besides listing these four
-equirements he indicates that there is no arrest where a truck is
stopped on the highway to be weighed and sent along without undue
delay, and this situation is analogous to those under consideration.2'
Such case authority as exists on the application of the law of arrest
18. See Edwards v. State, supra note 17.
19. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201 (1940).
20. Id. at 208.
21. Id. at 207.
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to the mere stopping of a motor vehicle is scant. But a reasonable
view'2 would seem to support Perkins, and therefore, one cannot con-
clude, by calling the mere stopping of an automobile an arrest, that the
"display" statutes were intended to require specific probable cause.
2. "Interpretation" Approach
The alternate approach, the "Interpretation," although its avail-
ability is somewhat limited, presents a more convincing argument for
the probable cause requirement. Besides the "display" statute, almost
every motor vehicle code contains a section enumerating the powers
of highway patrol officers. -23 These fall into three broad categories:
(1) those requiring no probable cause to stop a motorist in any case,2
(2) the considerable number that grant police the power to stop and
inspect any car which they reasonably believe to be operating with
defective equipment,1 and most important to the approach discussed
here, (3) the provisions which allow the officers to stop and inspect a
vehicle upon reasonable belief that its equipment is defective or that
any other provisions of the code are being violated.2 It is this third
"catch-all" clause which provides the basis for the "Interpretation"
approach.
This approach proposes that the "display" statute with its "shall
exhibit" language merely prescribes the ditty of the motorist, and does
not attempt to restrict or expand the powers of the police. Such
powers, so the argument goes, are to be found in the provisions of the
general statute specifying the rights and duties of highway officers.
Since the "powers" statute requires probable cause prior to any stop-
ping, and it is in pari materia with the "display" statute, the two are
in conflict, and the incongruity can be avoided only if the latter also
requires probable cause, i.e., the operator need exhibit his license only
on lawful demand. Of course, this argument can be asserted only in a
state where the "powers" statute includes a "catch-all" clause. Re-
cently the Nebraska legislature eliminated the "catch-all" clause from
22. See Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1957).
23. This note does not purport to distinguish acts of highway patrol officers
from those of other law enforcement authorities within a given state. It is sub-
mitted, however, that there is little difference in effect. See Edwards v. State,
319 P.2d 1021 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), which stated, "we must assume that
peace officers in general would have no less restrictions than highway patrolmen,
in their demands to see the license of the driver of a motor vehicle, particularly
when the vehicle was in motion and there was no justification in stopping the
same other than to examine the license of the driver." Id. at 1026.
24. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 321.492 (1949).
25. See, e.g., Ariz. Code Ann. § 28-982A (1956).
26. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-49(d) (1953).
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its "powers" statute,27 thus denying motorists the possible use of this
approach. Whether other states will follow its lead and amend their
"powers" statutes remains to be seen.28
The applicability of the "Interpretation" approach is illustrated by
Edwards v. State.2 In that case two policemen saw the defendant
leave the home of a known bootlegger, climb into his automobile and
drive away. One of the officers previously had seen the defendant con-
victed for driving without a license and for illegal whiskey traffic.
They pursued and intercepted the car, and when defendant admitted
he had no driver's license, placed him under arrest. The vehicle was
then searched and illegal liquor uncovered. In his prosecution for the
liquor violation, defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but the
motion was overruled. Affirming this decision of the lower court, the
court of appeals cited both the "powers"30 and "display" statutes, and
in applying the "Interpretation" approach said:
[U]nder such circumstances no peace officer could be justified in
stopping a motor vehicle and demanding to examine a driver's
license except "upon reasonable belief" that the vehicle "is being
operated in violation of any provision of the . . . Act . . . or
any other law regulating the operation of vehicles", except per-
haps where a road block has been established for wholesale check-
ing.31
The court went on to hold, however, that since one of the officers had
prior knowledge of the defendant's lack of license, there was sufficient
"reasonable belief" to warrant the interception.2
It is submitted that a requirement of specific probable cause in the
pull-over situation is not an appropriate control device. The decision
of the Florida court in the Aronovitz case to the effect that such a re-
27. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-413 (1952) (amended by Neb. Laws 1959, c. 295).
28. There is a third possible approach in this area. It could be argued that the
statutes regulating inspection for mechanical defects and those dealing with
driver's licenses are equally essential to public safety, and therefore, if one re-
quires probable cause, the other should also. If accepted, this theory would ob-
viate the necessity for the "Interpretation" approach. However, there is far
greater inconvenience in terms of delay to the motorist whose automobile is sub-
jected to an equipment inspection than to the operator who merely displays his
license and drives on. Practically, then, this argument carries little weight.
29. 319 P.2d 1021 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
30. The "powers" statute in Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 366(4)
(1956), is in greater conflict with the "display" provision than the usual "catch-
all" type, for it specifically states that reasonable belief is required before police
can stop cars for a license check. Therefore, this case does not fully support the
"Interpretation" approach.
31. 319 P.2d at 1026.
32. This case included contentions of subterfuge, but they were rejected by the
court. The situation here was rather extraordinary, for seldom does an officer
have reasonable belief, prior to stopping a car, that the driver has no license.
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quirement would "produce almost total disablement of law enforce-
ment officers in the performance of a needed police power . . .,31 has
equal validity in the pull-over situation unless the roadblock be deemed
the only reasonable means to the end of licensing law enforcement.
Such a drastic limitation does not seem warranted because: (1) it
should be the presumption until rebutted that the police have acted in
good faith,34 and (2) those drivers pulled over for the license check are
generally put to little delay and inconvenience3 5 A more suitable
control device in the author's view is the "subterfuge" doctrine.3 6
B. THE "SUBTERFUGE" DOCTRINE
Since the 1944 decision of its Supreme Court in Cox v. State,
37
Tennessee has been the leading advocate of this device to offer the
motorist some protection against the apparently absolute mandate of
the typical "display" statute.38 In that case, two highway patrolmen
followed the defendant's car, pulled him over, and demanded that he
produce his driver's license. He gave his license to the officers, and
while examining it, they noticed what appeared to be illegal whiskey
in the car, searched further, and arrested the defendant on the basis
of the whiskey uncovered. At the trial, a motion to suppress the evi-
dence which placed in issue the validity of the original stopping was
overruled. On appeal, the court reversed holding that where all the
circumstances "showed that the officers stopping the defendant had no
concern whatever about his driver's license, but he was put under
restraint for the purpose of discovering whiskey . . ."9 and he was
33. Note 13 supra.
34. United States v. Long, 52 F.2d 901 (D.N.J. 1931).
35. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959), where
the driver was permitted to continue after stopping and merely displaying his
license.
36. In jurisdictions which recognize this protective device, it may be argued
successfully that the police lacked authority without resort to either the "Arrest"
or the "Interpretation" approach, for, even if the court refuses to construe the
"display" statute to require probable cause, it will nevertheless reverse a conviction
if the officers acted in bad faith. See generally Annot., 154 A.L.R. 812 (1945).
37. 181 Tenn. 344, 181 S.W.2d 338 (1944).
38. There is a logical explanation for Tennessee's strong adherence to this
doctrine; its "display" provision contains a unique proviso. It specifically requires
that police, other than highway patrolmen, can stop a motorist and demand his
license only if he is violating a state or municipal regulation. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 59-709 (Supp. 1959). As to city police then, probable cause is required by the
statute, thus destroying any necessity for the "Arrest" or "Interpretation" ap-
proaches in cases of detention by municipal authorities. By its terms, this statute
grants absolute power to highway officers, and therefore the necessity for pro-
tection of the motorist is acute.
39. 181 Tenn. at 347, 181 S.W.2d at 340.
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arrested on the basis of the whiskey discovered, the arrest was a mere
subterfuge, and violated his constitutional rights. The court stated
that while a state highway patrolman may stop a driver at any time to
examine his driver's license, "he cannot do so as a mere pretense in
order to search the automobile for whiskey or any other contraband
article."40 Highway patrolmen were given the exceptional authority
to stop cars at any time solely because their chief duty was the enforce-
ment of the traffic laws for the safety of the travelling public. "The
statutes certainly did not contemplate conferring this authority upon
them to enable them to circumvent the constitutional provision against
searches of the person and property of a citizen without a valid search
warrant."41 On almost identical facts in the later case of Robertson v.
State, 2 the court said that officers must exercise the right to check
driver's licenses "in good faith and not as a pretext or subterfuge for
an inspection of or a prying into the contents of an automobile .... -41
Tennessee "will not permit an evasion of the requirements of the law
with regard to search warrants through the device, pretext, or subter-
fuge of a pretended examination of a driver's license." 44
The Michigan case of People v. Roach45 also adopts the "subterfuge"
doctrine. There a motorcycle policeman pulled over the defendant's
car and asked the driver to produce a license. He did not have one and
the officer then searched the car and discovered illegal liquor on the
basis of which the defendant was arrested. At the trial, the defend-
ant's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was ob-
tained by an illegal search was overruled and he was convicted of
illegal liquor traffic. The officer had testified that his sole reason for
stopping the car was that he became suspicious when the occupants of
the car kept looking back at him. On appeal, the state supreme court
reversed, holding that the search without a warrant was unconstitu-
tional since the police were not entitled to "promiscuously stop auto-
mobiles upon the public highway and demand the driver's license
merely as a subterfuge to invade the constitutional right of the traveler
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure."'1 Implicit in this
statement is the rule that while an officer may always stop a car to see
whether the driver is licensed, he may not then proceed to conduct a
search on the bare suspicion that the occupants might have committed
some other crime. After a car is stopped for the purpose of the license
40. Id. at 348, 181 S.W.2d at 340.
41. Ibid.
42. 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947).
43. Id. at 283, 198 S.W.2d at 635.
44. Id. at 284, 198 S.W.2d at 635.
45. 237 Mich. 215, 211 N.W. 742 (1927).
46. Id. at 222, 211 N.W. at 744.
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check, the officer must then notice something which gives him probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed before any search is law-
ful.47
Thus the conclusion is warranted that the "subterfuge" doctrine will
afford a motorist relief only in those important cases where he is prose-
cuted for a crime other than driving without a license on the basis of
evidence obtained by a search of the car.48 That the police have abso-
lute power to stop cars and check drivers' licenses is desirable. It is
only where police seek to use this power to search for evidence of other
crimes without probable cause or a search warrant that a driver merits
the protection afforded by the "subterfuge" doctrine. The fact that
the officer's motive in stopping the car frequently cannot be easily chal-
lenged at the litigation stage for lack of proof is obvious.49 But this
is no reason to discard the doctrine, for often, as in the Cox case,50
that motive may be satisfactorily ascertained by an examination of
the circumstances surrounding the stopping, what the officer said and
did, and whether there was anything which the officer might have
noticed before the search which would have given him sufficient prob-
able cause to conduct the search that was later undertaken. This is a
factual question which may be decided by the court, or in the usual
case where the issue is doubtful, it may be submitted to the jury51
An interesting additional remedy for the motorist which might be
used in connection with the "subterfuge" doctrine was developed by
the Indiana legislature in 1957. At that time, it amended the "display"
statute by adding that "no person shall be charged with violating this
section, who within five [5] days from the time of apprehension, pro-
duces to the apprehending officer or headquarters of the apprehending
officer satisfactory evidence or a permit or license theretofore issued
47. See Gause v. State, 203 Miss. 377, 34 So. 2d 729 (1948).
48. The trend has been to read a requirement of "good faith" into "display"
statutes. However, this is not to be confused with probable cause. The former
questions whether the officer in fact stopped the vehicle for his avowed purpose,
whereas the latter questions whether the stopping was based upon sufficient legal
grounds.
49. Note, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 347, 356.
50. Note 37 supra.
51. The validity of the "subterfuge" doctrine in Florida is still questionable.
Although the Supreme Court of that state impliedly adopted it in the Aronovitz
case, it neglected to consider a decision of the court of appeals decided in the
same year, Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1959), which stated that the
motive of the officer acting under the "display" statute was immaterial. In this
latter case, the conviction was reversed on other grounds, which explains perhaps
the failure of the Aronovitz court to comment upon it. Besides, the earlier decision
of the supreme court in Byrd v. State, 80 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1955), strengthens the
possibility that the doctrine may be employed in a proper case in that state.
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to him and valid at the time of apprehension. ' '62 While this provision
probably was intended by the legislature more as a convenience to
motorists than as a curb on the unauthorized exercise of a power by
the police, it is interesting to note that the police tried unsuccessfully
to get the amendment repealed in 1959. The amendment, of course,
deprives the police of the power to arrest for failure to display at the
time of the stopping and thereafter to conduct a search incident to
the arrest.53 So it is obvious that the police recognized that the "dis-
play" statute was a convenient means by which to stop and search the
car of an unlicensed driver who was otherwise obeying the law by all
appearances. Assuming for the sake of this discussion that the police
are empowered to conduct a search incident to an arrest for failure to
display a driver's license, an amendment to the "display" statute such
as that in Indiana is the only way to offer the motorist the protection,
where he is unable to display a license for some reason, that he enjoys
from the "subterfuge" doctrine in cases where he does display it.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the basic question in these cases involves the
pitting of society's interest in the effective policing of highways
against that of the individual in unobstructed travel.64 It appears that
stopping a driver by means of a roadblock or pull-over to determine
whether he possesses a valid license is both authorized by the "display"
statute and constitutionally permissible as a necessary regulation for
the public safety. But while such procedures are reasonably calculated
to achieve the effective policing of today's congested roads, the inter-
ception of an individual motorist by the police under a claim of author-
ization by the "display" statute should not be upheld when the evidence
shows that such a claim is a subterfuge and the officer's real motive
is to conduct an unwarranted search for evidence of another crime of
which he merely suspects the motorist. Finally, all "display" statutes
should be amended along the lines of the Indiana statute to provide
that the motorist may not be arrested if he subsequently furnishes the
police with satisfactory proof that he possessed a valid license at the
time he was stopped and the display demanded. This procedure is de-
52. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-2714 (b) (Supp. 1960).
53. For a comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the problem, see Note,
1959 Wis. L. Rev. 347.
54. This is summed up by the Aronovitz court, 114 So. 2d at 789. "In matters
of the type before us, it is essential that we recognize the individual right and that
we simultaneously reconcile the enjoyment of that right with the needs of the
general good."
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sirable because, while depriving the police of another device to conduct
an unwarranted search, it will attain the end of ridding the roads of
unlicensed drivers without unduly burdening those who have valid
licenses but have neglected to have them on their persons through
forgetfulness or some other reason.
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